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HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE GROWTH IN
PHARMACEUTICAL EXPENDITURES*
PATRICIA M. DANZON and MARK V. PAULY
University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
This paper examines the contribution of insurance coverage to the recent unprec-
edented growth in spending on pharmaceuticals. Trends in drug spending over time
closely paralleled the growth in drug coverage. Most of the coverage growth reflects
an increase in the number of people with coverage, 65 percent from 1987 to 1996,
rather than increased depth of coverage. The direct moral hazard effect of this in-
surance growth accounts for between one-fourth and one-half of the increase in drug
spending. Technological change contributed to these changes, because both the flow
of new drugs increased the demand for insurance and information technologies en-
abled the development of pharmacy benefit management, which reduced the real
price of drug coverage. It is plausible that insurance growth also stimulated drug
promotion. The only obvious source of inefficiency is the tax subsidy, which may
lead to excessive insurance and promotion. This applies to all health care, not just
pharmaceuticals.
I. Introduction
The rapid growth of spending on pharmaceuticals in recent years has
captured the attention of managers, policy makers, consumers, and analysts.
Spending on outpatient drugs grew at a rate of 17 percent in 1999, compared
with 8.2 percent in 1990 and 1.1 percent in 1980, whereas total health spend-
ing grew at a rate of 3.3 percent in 1999, 6.4 percent in 1990, and 5.6 percent
in 1980. Consequently, the share of total health spending accounted for by
outpatient drugs increased from 4.9 percent in 1980 to 8.5 percent in 1999.
Drug spending is also blamed for a resumption of increases in health insurance
premiums, from .8 percent in 1996 to 8.3 percent in 2000.1 Previous analyses
of these trends have provided an accounting decomposition of the growth in
drug spending and have distinguished increases in volume of prescriptions
(scripts), shifts to more expensive products, and price increases for existing
products. In the 1990s, the dominant contributors to spending growth are
* The authors thank Edward Buckley for research assistance.
1 Bradley C. Strunk, Paul B. Ginsburg, & Jon R. Gabel, Tracking Health Care Costs: Growth
Accelerates Again in 2001, Health Aff. Web Exclusive (September 2002) (http://
www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/2106Strunk.pdf).
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Figure 1.—Growth in spending due to price versus volume and innovation (other). Year
over year percentage changes are shown. Data are from IMS Health, Retail and Provider
Perspective (February 2003).
more prescriptions and shifting to more expensive products, which together
account for 75 percent of total drug-spending growth in the 1994–99 time
period, with price increases accounting for only 25 percent of the total (see
Figure 1).
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the causes of the unprecedented
rise in outpatient drug use in the 1990s and, in particular, to examine the
role of growth in insurance coverage, which paralleled the acceleration of
drug spending. The share of outpatient drug expenditures paid out-of-pocket
declined from 69.4 percent in 1980 to 59.1 percent in 1990, with a more
rapid decline to 33.4 percent in 1999. Standard theories of insurance and
moral hazard suggest that this increase in drug coverage would trigger some
growth in utilization. Ernst Berndt identifies the growth in insurance as one
of four contributors to drug-spending growth, along with new products, the
relaxing of the rules governing direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising in 1997,
and “the importance of being unimportant,” a spending share too small to
attract the interest of cost controllers and one that has already self-corrected.2
Robert DuBois et al. discuss the role of new products. Neither of these prior
studies quantify the direct effect of insurance growth, nor do they discuss
the connection between insurance and these other contributing factors.3
2 Ernst R. Berndt, The U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry: Why Major Growth in Times of Cost
Containment? 20 Health Aff. 100 (March/April 2001).
3 Robert W. DuBois et al., Explaining Drug Spending Trends: Does Perception Match Reality?
19 Health Aff. 231 (March/April 2000).
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In this paper, we analyze both the direct effect of insurance on drug use
(the moral hazard effect) and several indirect channels whereby growth of
insurance can contribute to growth in drug spending. Specifically, we first
decompose the growth in overall insurance coverage to provide evidence on
how much of the decline in the percent paid out-of-pocket reflected an in-
crease in the number of people covered and how much reflected an increase
in the depth of coverage (fraction of spending covered) for those with in-
surance. Second, we use empirically based demand elasticity measures to
estimate how much of the spending growth might reasonably be attributed
to the direct or moral hazard effect of these insurance changes. We conclude
that these direct effects alone may account for one-fourth to one-half of the
growth in drug spending. Third, we discuss more qualitatively the possible
indirect effects of insurance, through incentives for research and development
(R&D) and hence the flow of new products, through incentives for DTC and
other forms of drug promotion, and through prices.
We also take the inquiry one step further back, to examine reasons for the
unprecedented growth in drug insurance during the 1990s. Several previous
authors (for example, Burton Weisbrod) have hypothesized that an increase
in insurance coverage can lead to a higher rate of technological change and
hence to a higher rate of change in spending and that there may be some
feedback effect from spending on demand for insurance.4 In the case of drugs,
we argue that the reverse effect is more likely, that technological change, in
the form of new drug therapies and new insurance technologies, contributed
to the growth in level and type of drug coverage, which in turn played a
major role in drug-spending growth. In conclusion, we offer some comments
on whether these trends are likely to continue and some preliminary nor-
mative analysis of whether the increases in coverage and in drug spending
is efficient.
II. Trends in Drug Expenditures and Coverage
Table 1 documents the time trends in expenditures and insurance coverage
for drugs relative to other medical services in the United States for the period
1960–98. Over this long time frame, spending growth shifted from the in-
patient sector to the outpatient sector. For the first 2 decades, drug spending
grew less rapidly than hospital spending. Consequently, the drug share of
total spending declined from 10 percent in 1960 to about 5 percent in 1985.
In the last half of the 1980s, hospital spending growth declined relative to
both drug spending and physician spending. Since 1990, drug spending has
outpaced all the other major spending components. In real terms, drug-
spending growth, although higher than the growth of real gross domestic
4 Burton A. Weisbrod, The Health Care Quadrilemma: An Essay on Technological Change,
Insurance, Quality of Care, and Cost Containment, 29 J. Econ. Literature 523 (1991).
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TABLE 1
Trends in Expenditures and Insurance Coverage, 1960–99: Pharmaceuticals and Other Medical Services
1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Expenditure share categories (%):
Hospital care 34.4 37.8 41.3 36.5 34.7 34.2 33.7 33.0 32.3
Physician services 20.1 19.1 19.2 22.6 22.3 22.1 22.1 22.3 22.2
Prescription drugs 10.0 7.5 4.9 5.8 6.1 6.5 6.9 7.6 8.5
All other 35.5 35.5 34.6 35.1 36.9 37.3 37.3 37.1 37.0
Growth rates:
Prescription drugs:
Real annual expenditure growtha N.A. 4.6 1.1 8.2 6.0 8.4 11.2 13.6 17.0
% paid out of pocket 96 82.4 69.4 59.1 42.7 39.5 36.8 34.9 33.4
Average annual change in % paid out of pocket N.A. 1.4 1.3 1.0 3.2 2.7 2.7 1.9 1.5
Average annual % change in proportion paid out of pocket N.A. 1.4 1.8 1.5 6.2 6.6 7.0 5.3 4.3
Total personal health spending:
Real annual growtha N.A. 7.3 5.6 6.4 4.8 3.4 3.7 3.9 3.3
% paid out of pocket 55.2 39.7 27.1 22.5 16.9 16.7 16.9 17.3 17.4
Average annual % change in proportion paid out of pocket N.A. 2.8 3.2 1.7 5.0 1.2 1.2 2.4 .5
Source.—Health Care Financing Administration, Historical National Health Expenditures by Type of Service and Source of Funds: Calendar Years 1960–2000
(September 17, 2002) (http://cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/default.asp).
Note.—These figures differ from those in table 2 in Patricia M. Danzon & Mark V. Pauly, Insurance and New Technology: From Hospital to Drug Store, 20 (5)
Health Aff. 86 (2001), because they reflect substantial revisions in government estimates of health expenditures and, especially, prescription drug coverage.
a Deflated by GNP implicit price deflator; continuous growth rates.
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product (GDP), decelerated until about 1980, then began to pick up and grew
at double-digit rates from 1997 onward.5 These trends no doubt reflect many
causes, including technological change, that enabled the shift of care from
inpatient to outpatient settings. However, the bottom seven rows of Table 1
suggest that trends in insurance coverage may have played a role.
Trends in insurance coverage for outpatient drugs move in close parallel
to these trends in drug expenditures, growing slowly initially and than ac-
celerating in the 1990s. The center four rows of Table 1 show that for each
decade from 1960 to 1990, the proportion of aggregate drug expenditures
paid out-of-pocket fell about 12 percentage points per decade, from 96 percent
in 1960 to about 59 percent in 1990, then dropping to about 33 percent in
1999. But measured as an annual percentage change in the out-of-pocket
share, which takes into account the decline in the base coverage level over
time, the rate of growth of coverage has accelerated from less than 2 percent
per year through the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s to 6–7 percent per year in the
mid-1990s. Thus, the acceleration of drug spending in the 1990s coincides
with a dramatic acceleration in the rate of growth of drug coverage. By
contrast, the percent paid out-of-pocket for other personal health spending
leveled off and then slightly increased in the late 1990s (Table 1).
This overall pattern for the last 40 years of positive correlation between
trends in growth in drug insurance coverage and (slightly lagged) drug-
spending growth is consistent with the hypothesis that changes in spending
are positively related to changes in insurance coverage. But correlation, of
course, does not establish causation in any event.
With regard to the components of the drug-spending growth, as indicated
in Figure 1, on the basis of IMS Health data, the increase in drug spending
in the 1990s was associated primarily with increases in the volume of pre-
scriptions or units per capita and shifts toward more expensive products,
which together comprise about 80 percent of the growth in drug spending
over this period. Only about 20 percent (or less, depending on the year) is
attributable to rising prices for existing products;6 of this, over half is due
to economy-wide inflation, leaving a very small share attributable to excess
5 The measures of drug expenditures reported in the National Health Accounts (NHA) do
not include drugs purchased during a hospital stay, physician or clinic visit, or some nursing
home stays, because these expenditures are classified as revenues of the institution that received
payment. The NHA drug-spending estimates are also reduced to reflect rebates from drug
manufacturers to insurers. For these and other reasons, total drug spending as reported in the
NHA may differ from the drug-spending total reported by IMS Health.
6 The contribution of price increase may depend on the type of index used—base-weighted
Laspeyres or chained Divisia. The source is unclear on this point. IMS Health, Retail and
Provider Perspective (February 2003) (http://www.imshealth.com).
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inflation of drug prices.7 This predominant role for volume growth and mix
upgrade are consistent with insurance being an important inducement to
spending growth because of the moral hazard effects of coverage on volume.
Although some forms of insurance could also induce price growth, the man-
aged care form that predominated has plausibly controlled price growth rel-
ative to what it might have been under indemnity insurance, but the structure
of managed drug benefits may have contributed to mix upgrade, as discussed
below.
Cross-national comparisons provide a rough way of distinguishing the role
of new technologies relative to other contributors to health-spending growth.
Specifically, if new technologies diffuse to the same degree in countries at
similar levels of income and industrialization, then cross-national differences
in spending growth among these countries might provide a very rough in-
dicator of the role of country-specific differences in insurance coverage
growth. The recent trends in drug spending are not unique to the United
States; several other industrialized countries (for example, the United King-
dom, Canada, and Germany) have also experienced more rapid growth of
spending on drugs than on physician and hospital services. However, in
countries such as Germany or the United Kingdom that already had universal
drug coverage by the early 1990s, the differential between expenditure growth
on drugs and other services is less than in the United States, where there
was significant expansion of coverage over this period. Moreover, in Ger-
many, prices and volume of scripts have remained flat or have fallen since
1993, with all the spending growth coming from a shift to more expensive,
including new, products. Thus, the more rapid growth of drug spending in
the United States compared with other countries and the large role of volume
growth in the United States are consistent with the hypothesis that growth
in insurance coverage has played a significant role.
III. More People with Coverage, More Coverage per Person?
The evidence above suggests that rising insurance coverage has something
to do with the relatively rapid increase in pharmaceutical spending in the
United States. Evidence from both the United States and other countries
suggests that new products have played a major role in drug-spending growth.
Ideally, we would like to quantify the individual contributions of insurance
and new products to the expenditure growth. This decomposition is prob-
lematic, even conceptually, because insurance is expected to have both direct
7 Prices of existing products actually declined in real terms in 1994 and 1995, when coverage
was expanding most rapidly. Although this could partly reflect the market power of the new
pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), their market share increased over time, whereas price
increases trended upward. The 1994–95 drop in drug prices could also reflect the anticipation
that managed care buyers would be more powerful than they in fact turned out to be, as well
as the political climate associated with the Clinton health care debate.
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and indirect effects on the uptake of new products, including increased vol-
ume of scripts per capita and shift of mix from old to new products, which
in turn affects price per unit and per script. Moreover, reverse effects are
likely; that is, the expansion of range and expected cost of drug treatments
increases the demand for insurance coverage, as discussed below.
Before turning to estimates of the direct effect of insurance on drug-
spending growth, in this section we provide some evidence on the decom-
position of insurance growth into number of people with coverage and depth
of coverage per person. The next section provides rough estimates of the
potential direct effect of this insurance growth on spending growth. Subse-
quent sections then discuss the indirect effects of insurance, including the
stimulus of insurance to R&D and hence number of new products and the
reverse effect of new products on demand for drug coverage; advertising;
price levels for new products; and price change for old products.
How was the increase in the overall percentage of drug expenditures paid
by insurance—from about 40 percent in 1990 to over 75 percent in
1999—distributed between growth in the number of people with coverage
and increase in the depth of coverage for those with coverage? Broad trends
in health insurance coverage suggest a mix of both effects. In the 1980s and
1990s managed care insurance in its various forms (health maintenance or-
ganizations (HMOs), preferred provider organizations, and others) largely
replaced traditional indemnity insurance for general health insurance. Tra-
ditional indemnity insurance covered hospital and physician services but
typically did not cover outpatient prescription drugs. Thus, the Medicare
program for seniors, which was modeled on the typical private indemnity
insurance plan of the mid-1960s, does not cover outpatient prescription drugs.
Indemnity insurers relied on patient copayments to control moral hazard but
were otherwise largely passive payers for whatever covered expenses patients
incurred. The defining feature of managed care plans was the use of incentives
and controls targeted at providers to control moral hazard, in particular,
selective contracting, negotiated discounts, and risk-sharing forms of reim-
bursement for providers (such as capitation) and prior authorization and
utilization review to determine ex ante whether expensive procedures would
be covered. These managed care techniques were applied to outpatient drugs,
often by specialized pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs). Managed drug
benefits were included in most managed care plans, and many indemnity
plans subsequently added a managed drug benefit, usually contracted out to
PBMs, especially for employee coverage. Drug coverage also became more
available to some seniors through employer-based retiree benefits and the
managed plan options offered under the MedicareChoice alternative to
traditional Medicare.8 Given these trends in the types of insurance products
8 Possibly offsetting these trends toward more people with drug coverage could be a decline
in the percent of retirees with employer-based coverage, as employers supposedly reduced their
postretirement health benefits in response to Federal Accounting Standard (FAS) 106.
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available, some increase in the number of people with coverage is expected.
At the same time, an increase in depth of coverage is also possible, as
managed plans relied less on patient copayments and more on other cost
control strategies. Through the mid-1990s, managed drug benefits typically
had either a single copayment per script or a two-tier copayment per script
($5 for a generic, $10 for a brand). This structure is expected to offer some-
what deeper coverage than indemnity plans, which typically included a drug-
specific deductible and 20 percent cost sharing above the deductible if they
covered drugs at all.
For several reasons, it is not simple to provide rough quantitative estimates
of the changes in number of people with coverage and average depth of
coverage. The best available data are from household surveys of insurance
coverage, specifically, the 1986–87 National Medical Expenditure Survey
(NMES) and the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). These
surveys ask respondents whether they have specific types of health insurance
(private, Medicare, Medicaid, and others), but neither these nor other surveys
asked respondents whether they had outpatient drug coverage. Indeed, the
concept itself is potentially ambiguous since policies could cover some drugs
in some circumstances but not in others. For example, would a catastrophic
policy that provides full coverage of medical services above a $10,000 de-
ductible be said to “cover drugs”? Or a policy that explicitly provides cov-
erage for only certain expensive or life-saving drugs? Respondent error is
also a potential problem if household respondents do not know or have
forgotten what their insurance covers.9 Moreover, individuals may be eligible
for some forms of third-party payment that they may or may not define as
insurance; for example, some states have special drug programs for low-
income seniors and other needy groups, and most drug manufacturers have
charity programs that provide drugs free or at discounted prices to needy
individuals.
In order to avoid these definitional ambiguities, we define people with
drug insurance as those who report a self-pay amount less than the total drug
expense, conditional on having positive outpatient drug expense. Similarly,
we define the insurance payment as this residual difference between the total
drug and the self-pay amount. Depth of coverage is the ratio of the insurance
payment to total drug expense. By means of the measures that were calculated
for the 1987 NMES survey and the 1996 MEPS survey, we calculate the
growth in the number of people with coverage and the growth in depth of
coverage. These estimates are no doubt subject to imperfect information on
the part of survey respondents and recall bias; however, as long as the average
errors do not change between the two surveys, our measures of growth should
9 Matching expenses reported by the household to plan provisions is not easy. The MEPS
survey ran into problems trying to obtain plan documents from employers to verify whether
some type of expense might ever be covered by the employee’s insurance plan.
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TABLE 2
Drug Spending and Insurance: The 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey
(NMES) versus the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), Excluding
People with Medicaid and Other Public Insurance, Ages 25–64
% with Rx
Expense
Expense/
Capita ($)
Benefit/
Capita ($)
Benefit/
Expense (%)
% with
Insured Rx
Expense
With private health insurance:
1987 NMES 57.8 110.93 50.43 45.46 29.5
1996 MEPS 68.5 264.56 160.82 60.79 57.1
All
Insured,
Expense/
Capita
($)
Insured with Insured Rx Expense All
Uninsured,
Expense/
Capita ($)
Expense/
Capita ($)
Benefit/
Capita ($)
Benefit/
Expense (%)
1987 NMES 110.9 261.35 170.88 65.4 65.33
1996 MEPS 264.6 437.25 282.64 64.6 132.92
Insured with Rx Expense Uninsured
with
Rx
Expense
Insured Rx
Expense
No Rx
Insurance
Prescriptions per capita:
1987 NMES 10.23 5.54 8.19
1996 MEPS 12.6 4.64 10.22
Expense/prescription:
1987 NMES 25.55 21.55 19.93
1996 MEPS 34.7 29.19 29.93
Note.—Rx: prescription.
be unbiased (more on this below). Defining the change in the number of
people with drug coverage by the change in the number who report positive
drug insurance payment, conditional on drug expense, could yield an upward
(downward) biased estimate of the true increase in percent of people with
drug coverage if the probability of obtaining a prescription, conditional on
having coverage, increased (decreased) between 1987 and 1996.
Tables 2 and 3 show trends between 1987 and 1996 in various indicators
of drug use and insurance coverage. Table 2 represents the population aged
25–64, excluding those who report being covered by public insurance pro-
grams (Medicaid, Medicare, the Veterans Association, Champus). This is the
population potentially likely to buy private insurance. Table 2 shows trends
in drug use and coverage for all persons with private health insurance and
reports trends in use for subgroups of the population by health insurance and
drug insurance status. Table 3 shows trends in drug use and coverage for the
over-65 population. Although outpatient drug coverage is not included in
traditional Medicare, seniors may obtain drug coverage from one of several
sources: Medicaid covers drugs for the lowest-income seniors in all states,
and some states have developed additional drug programs for needy seniors
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TABLE 3
Drug Spending and Insurance: The 1987 National Medical Expenditure
Survey (NMES) versus the 1996 Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey (MEPS), Age 65 and Over
% with Rx
Expense
Expense/
Capita ($)
Benefit/
Capita ($)
Benefit/
Expense (%)
% with Insured
Rx Expense
1987 NMES 81 333.43 102.06 30.6 35.7
1996 MEPS 87.8 709.95 313.52 44.2 64.4
With insured Rx expense:
1987 NMES 530.37 286.25 54.0
1996 MEPS 909.23 487.02 53.6
Insured
Rx Expense No Rx Insurance
Prescriptions per capita:
1987 NMES 21.97 14.83
1996 MEPS 25.37 16.62
Expense/prescription:
1987 NMES 24.14 22.13
1996 MEPS 35.84 32.03
Note.—Rx: prescription.
not eligible for Medicaid; employer retiree policies usually cover drugs if
drugs are included in the coverage for active-duty employees; some Medigap
policies include drug coverage (these are supplementary policies to traditional
Medicare and are subject to strict regulation and severe adverse selection);
and most Medicare HMOs offer some drug coverage, although both the
number of Medicare HMOs and the level of drug coverage offered have
declined since 1997.
For the under-65 group with general health insurance, the proportion with
positive drug expense increased from 57.8 in 1987 to 68.5 percent in 1996,
a 18.5 percent increase. By contrast, the proportion with drug insurance
(measured as those reporting insured drug expense) increased by 93.6 percent,
from 29.5 percent to 57.1 percent. Thus, conditional on having positive drug
expense, the percent of the health-insured under-65 population who also had
drug insurance increased from 51 percent in 1987 to 83.3 percent in 1996,
a 63 percent increase.10 For the over-65 population, the trends are similar.
The proportion of seniors with positive drug expense increased slightly, from
81 percent to 87.8 percent, while the percent with insured drug expense
increased 80.6 percent. Thus, conditional on positive drug expense, the per-
cent of seniors with insurance coverage increased from 44 percent to 73
percent, which implies a 66 percent increase in the percent with drug cov-
erage, conditional on positive drug expense. Thus, the percentage growth in
the number of people with coverage is similar for the under-65 and over-65
10
.29.5/57.8p 51; 57.1/68.5p 83.3
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populations, despite the differences in coverage options available to each
group.
In contrast to this striking increase in the number of people with coverage,
there was essentially no change in depth of coverage (percent of expense
covered). For those with health insurance who also had insured drug expense,
the percent of their drug expense (Benefit/Expense) that was covered by
insurance remained at roughly 65 percent for the under-65 population, while
for the over-65 population, the percent of expense covered by insurance was
stable at 54 percent.
Overall, there is significant growth in spending per person with insured
prescription (Rx) expense, in both the number of Rxs and the cost per Rx
in constant 1996 dollars. For the under-65 population with health insurance
and drug coverage, the number of scripts per capita increased 23 percent,
from 10.2 in 1987 to 12.6 in 1996. By contrast, those who had no drug
insurance but had positive Rx expense show a decline in number of scripts
per capita, from 5.5 to 4.6. A plausible explanation for this apparent decline
in utilization by those with health insurance who did not have drug coverage
is that the growth of drug coverage has been subject to biased selection:
those with higher expected demand for drugs were more likely to buy drug
coverage, and only those least likely to need drug coverage remained without
drug insurance by 1996.
By contrast, for those uninsured for general health expenses, those with
positive Rx expense had a level and rate of increase in number of scripts
per capita, from 8.2 to 10.2, that are only slightly lower than the level and
rate of increase for those with drug coverage. This suggests that, to the extent
that gaps in drug insurance remain a problem for the under-65 population,
severe financial exposure occurs predominantly for those who are also un-
insured for other health expenditures, not for those who have health insurance
but choose not to buy drug coverage. This conclusion is confirmed by the
evidence in Table 4, which shows that the out-of-pocket expense for those
in the top quartile of drug expense ($865) is almost twice as high for those
who are uninsured for other medical expenses than it is for those who have
general health insurance but lack drug coverage ($443).
In addition to the modest increase in the number of scripts per capita, the
larger factor contributing to growth in spending per person with drug insur-
ance is expense per script, which increased by 36 percent for those with drug
insurance. For the uninsured, the absolute increase in expense per script is
similar (about $10) but the percentage increase is greater (50 percent) because
the absolute cost per script is lower for the uninsured. This high number of
scripts as well as expense per script for both the health- and drug-insured
population and the health- and drug-uninsured population with Rx expense
suggest that moral hazard is far from the whole story behind the growth in
expense per script. Rather, drug therapies have become increasingly valuable
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TABLE 4
Mean Drug Expense and Coverage for Top Quartile Users,a
Constant 1996 Dollars
NMES 1987b MEPS 1996
Ages 25–65:
With health insurance:
With insured Rx expense:
Total 756 1,317
Insurance 497 875
% covered 65 66
No insured Rx expense:
Total 179 151
Insurance 0 0
Rx expense, no Rx insurance:
Total 352 443
Insurance 0 0
Uninsured:
With Rx expense:
Total 500 998
Insurancec 100 133
Over 65:
With insured Rx expense:
Total 1,271 2,463
Insurance 694 1,366
% covered 55 55
Rx expense, no Rx insurance:
Total 835 1,543
Insurance 0 0
Note.—MEPS: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey; NMES: National Medical
Expenditure Survey; Rx: prescription.
a Mean expense for fourth quartile of distribution of drug expenditures.
b 1987 dollars adjusted to 1996 using the gross domestic product deflator.
c Insurance defined as shows some positive amounts forTotal Self-Pay
those who report that they are uninsured.
forms of treatment that are demanded by those without insurance as well as
by those with insurance.
In real terms, drug expense per capita for people under 65 increased by
128 percent in this 9-year period, from $107 in 1987 to $244 in 1996 in
constant 1996 dollars (figures not in Table 2). For those with health insurance
(with and without drug insurance), the rate of increase is 138 percent, from
$111 in 1987 to $265 in 1996, whereas for those without health insurance,
the increase is 103 percent, from $65 to $133. Among those with health
insurance, per capita drug spending appears to have grown more slowly for
those with drug coverage, although it started at a higher level—a 67 percent
increase, from $261 to $437. This lower apparent rate of increase in expense
per capita for those with drug insurance than for those without probably
reflects biased selection in the growth of drug coverage. Specifically, if the
sickest people are the first to purchase drug insurance, then as coverage
increases over time, the drug-insured population expands to include more
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who are intrinsically low risk. This shift in risk profile within the group with
health insurance would bias down the estimate of change in average expense
per capita for those with insurance. Thus, without risk adjustment, we cannot
accurately estimate from these aggregate data the increase in use for those
with insurance compared with those without. Mean drug expense per capita
remains much lower overall for those without health insurance than for those
with health insurance. Since most (83 percent) of those with health insurance
also had drug insurance by 1996, if they had drug Rx, this overall differential
is consistent with a moral hazard effect from insurance, both from general
insurance and drug insurance. This moral hazard effect appears to be due
mostly to a lower probability of any positive Rx expense for those without
health insurance (this has increased slightly over time, from 40 percent in
1987 to 43 percent in 1996). For the uninsured with Rx expense, the number
of scripts and expense per script are only 15–20 percent lower than for the
insured who also have drug insurance and Rx expense.11
The finding of no increase in depth of coverage for those with drug cov-
erage and positive expense is somewhat surprising, given the fact that tra-
ditional indemnity plans generally had sizeable deductibles plus 20 percent
or more copayments, whereas PBM plans generally have no deductible and
a modest copayment per script, say $5 for a generic and $10 for a brand. It
is possible that PBM coverage is more likely to have upper limits or exclu-
sions, but we know of no evidence to support this. It is also possible that
there is greater underreporting of the amount paid by insurance in 1996
because of the growth in managed pharmacy benefits, which are card-based
plans. In such plans, consumers pay only their copayment and hence may
be unaware of the amount reimbursed by the plan to the pharmacy. Since
card-based plans were a much larger fraction of total coverage in 1996 than
in 1987, if systematic underreporting of covered expense occurs in card-
based plans, the resulting underestimate of the amount paid by insurance
would be greater in 1996, which would lead us to underestimate the growth
in depth of coverage.
To address the question of whether the new forms of coverage provide
better catastrophic coverage, we examined coverage and out-of-pocket ex-
pense for those in the top quartile of drug expenditures. For individuals under
65 with drug insurance and in the top quartile of the overall distribution of
drug expense, the mean percent covered by insurance increased very slightly,
from 65 in 1987 to 66 percent in 1996 (see Table 4), which is very similar
11 In an earlier version of this paper, presented at the American Economics Association
meetings in January 2001, we reported rather different estimates of the growth in spending
attributable to an increase in the number of people with insurance versus expenditure per
insured person. Those estimates defined everyone who reported insured expense as “insured,”
whereas the present estimates distinguish between people who report having health insurance
and the uninsured and then define insured expense as the difference between total and self-
paid expense.
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to the overall mean level of coverage of 65 percent for those in this age
group with insured Rx expense in both periods. Similarly, for the over-65
population, the average coverage rate for those with insured Rx expense was
55 percent in both years, which is very close to the overall mean of 54
percent in both years. Thus, there is little evidence of an increase (or decrease)
in catastrophic coverage, which seems to refute the hypothesis that the finding
of no increase in depth of coverage or average co-insurance rate is due to
more or lower caps on coverage, which could have offset the lower up-front
copayments.
Although rough, these numbers do suggest conclusions about the role of
insurance coverage in the growth in spending. The largest contributors to
spending growth were the increase in the proportion of those with Rx expense
who had insurance for this expense, the increase in expense per person with
Rx expense (both of which increased by about 66 percent), and the higher
average spending for those with insurance than those without. Conditional
on positive Rx expense, mean spending per person with drug insurance was
much higher than for the uninsured. This evidence is highly consistent with
the hypothesis that having drug insurance coverage tends to increase drug
spending compared with being uninsured. However, these simple means may
not provide an unbiased measure of the moral hazard effects of insurance
coverage because they do not control for other risk characteristics of the
populations with and without drug insurance. How much of the growth can
reasonably be attributed to the traditional moral hazard volume effect is
discussed in Section V below.
IV. The Feedback between Insurance and
Research and Development
The diffusion of new, more expensive drugs, both as innovative new ther-
apies and as more modest improvements over older, less expensive drugs, is
a major descriptive driver of drug-spending growth in all countries.
Figure 2 shows the number of new molecular entities (NMEs) launched in
1990–2001. The number of NMEs launched per year more than doubled
between 1994 and 1996 and then declined again to the earlier level by 2001.
Since the absolute numbers are so small, inferences about trends are tentative.
With that caveat, these data suggest an upward trend in the first half of the
1990s, followed by a decline in the later years. This pattern, in particular
the mid-decade bulge, may reflect the reduction in the time required to obtain
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval following the introduction
of user fees in 1992. This could generate a one-time increase in the rate of
new product introductions, after which the new product flow would return
to steady state. Whatever the cause of this mid-decade acceleration in new
drug launches, it no doubt contributed to the 1997–99 acceleration in spending
growth, while the decline in new drug launches in 2000–2001 contributed
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Figure 2.—Total number of new molecular entities approved in the United States. Data
are from the Food and Drug Administration, Approval Times for Priority and Standard NMEs
(http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/NMEapps93-02.htm), and Food and Drug Administration, FDA
Drug Approvals List (http://www.fda.gov/cder/da/da.htm).
to the decline in spending growth in 2000–2002. A full analysis of the
contribution of new drugs to spending growth would have to also consider
biologics, new formulations, and new indications for existing drugs, which
are not reflected in Figure 2 and which are quantitatively the majority of
new drug launches. Conversely, patent expirations on major drugs can affect
spending levels, as generic entry dramatically reduces price levels relative
to brand prices prior to patent expiry. Patent expirations on several major
products have been a significant contributor to the recent slowing of drug-
spending growth.
Given the growth of drug insurance, an obvious question is the potential
impact of insurance on R&D and hence on the rate of new drug introductions.
Previous analyses of growth in health care spending more generally have
identified technological change as the major driver of spending growth and
have speculated on the role of insurance in driving technological change.
Pharmaceutical R&D, like any product investment decision, is no doubt
influenced by the expected demand for the product, which is positively related
to insurance coverage. Research and development spending grew both ab-
solutely and as a percent of sales, from 15.1 percent of sales in 1985 to 20.0
percent of sales in 1998, and then dropped to roughly 17.7 percent of sales
in 2001.12 However, the link between drug insurance and pharmaceutical
12 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Pharmaceutical Industry Profile
(2002).
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R&D spending and hence new product launches is complex, lagged, and
stochastic. The average total drug development time from synthesis to ap-
proval in the United States was 14.2 years in the 1980s.13 Thus, the new
product flow in any year presumably reflects demand projections over the
prior 14 years. It seems unlikely that the 1990s surge in insurance coverage
could have been anticipated in the 1980s when the 1990s products were
initiated. Moreover, since major drugs diffuse globally, the relevant market
demand is total expected global, not just U.S., sales and profits.
A second and very important factor complicating inferences about the
incentive effects of insurance on R&D and new product flows is the role of
exogenous new technology breakthroughs. These may come from basic re-
search related to medicine, such as research sponsored by the National In-
stitutes of Health on mapping the human genome, or from other sciences—for
example, informatics and robotics play a major role in drug discovery. The
importance of exogenous technology breakthroughs (plus luck) is evident in
the fact that new products tend to come in waves associated with specific
new therapeutic category breakthroughs—for example, the nonsteroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) in the 1970s; H2-antagonists and beta blockers
in the 1980s; and lipid lowerers, Ace inhibitors, antidepressants in the 1990s.
Although exogenous technology shocks were clearly critical in the ex-
pansion of the new product frontier, insurance coverage probably plays a
significant role in the number of drugs in each category and the number of
formulations and indications per molecule. When manufacturers make the
“go/no go” decision at various points during drug development, the incentive
to proceed with commercialization of a drug that will be sixth in class is
clearly greater the larger the potential sales for the class. Insurance coverage
expands the market for any indication by making patients more likely to seek
drug therapy and switch from older, cheaper drugs to newer, improved, and
more costly products. Insurance is therefore likely to make it worthwhile for
companies to launch more new drugs per therapeutic class and to develop
more formulations and indications per molecule.
If the causal link from insurance to new drugs is lagged and complex, the
converse causal link from technological breakthroughs to demand for insur-
ance coverage is clear and more immediate. The new drugs that were launched
in the late 1980s and 1990s offer improved treatment options for a number
of very prevalent disease categories, including treatments for chronic con-
ditions, such as depression and hyperlipidemia, and for acute conditions.
These improvements in available treatment technologies and hence in the
mean and variance of expected medical expense are predicted to increase
the demand for insurance.
Suppose that technology increases the number of disease states that can
13 Kenneth I. Kaitin & Joseph A. DiMasi, Measuring the Pace of New Drug Development
in the User Fee Era, 34 Drug Inf. J. 673 (2000).
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be effectively treated with drugs. As long as the available drugs treat only
a small number of disease states and would entail relatively small total
expense, the value to a risk-averse person of pooling this risk may be less
than the administrative cost of coverage. This is true a fortiori with moral
hazard. If new drugs become available to treat other disease states and if
administrative costs increase less than increases in expected expense, the
demand for drug coverage will rise. The predicted increase in insurance
demand is greater the more expensive the new drugs are (which increases
the financial risk should illness strike) and the greater the tax subsidy to
purchasing insurance (which effectively offsets the loading charge).
For medications for chronic conditions, the expected treatment expense is
less stochastic; hence the risk-pooling rationale for insurance is weaker. How-
ever, the tax subsidy to employer contributions to health insurance implies
that middle- and upper-income employees would be better off having these
expenses covered through insurance instead of paying out-of-pocket. Actual
pharmaceutical innovation in the 1990s surely satisfies this criterion of in-
creased expected expense, for both acute and chronic conditions, relative to
insurance loadings, net of the tax subsidy.
In addition to this stimulus to insurance demand from the technological
change in drug therapies, technological change in insurance systems has
probably also contributed to the growth of insurance coverage. In the late
1980s and 1990s, improvements in information systems made possible the
offering of managed pharmacy benefits that use more cost-effective strategies
for providing drug insurance than did traditional indemnity coverage. Phar-
macy benefit managers use formularies of preferred drugs, with incentives
to patients and physicians to use on-formulary drugs, and networks of phar-
macists that agree to discounted dispensing fees. The use of drug formularies
and selective pharmacy networks enables PBMs to negotiate discounts on
manufacturer prices and pharmacy dispensing fees that together are estimated
to reduce the cost of coverage by about 20–30 percent. Pharmacy benefit
managers also require that participating pharmacies be equipped to do on-
line, point-of-service verification of patient eligibility, to confirm whether a
drug is covered by the patient’s formulary, and to do drug utilization review
(DUR) to check for interactions and counterindications with other drugs the
patient may be taking. Patients are issued “smart” cards. These systems enable
the pharmacy to verify coverage and formulary compliance before the pur-
chase and to bill the plan directly, which leaves the patient to pay only the
copayment. By contrast, under traditional indemnity insurance, the patient
had to pay in full and then submit forms to the plan for reimbursement,
which could be rejected on grounds the service was not covered. Drug util-
ization review may also improve quality and reduce the risk of drug inter-
actions and other Rx errors. Pharmacy benefit managers also launched the
use of mail-order dispensing, particularly for chronic medications, which
further improves formulary compliances and reduces pharmacy and patient
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time costs. These PBM strategies reduce the administrative costs of con-
trolling moral hazard costs and reduce patient time and hassle costs, while
the negotiated discounts on drug prices and pharmacy dispensing fees reduce
the actual cost of drugs, relative to being either uninsured or having indemnity
drug coverage. Managed drug benefits thus reduce the real price of insured
drug coverage, relative to indemnity insurance, and reduce the real cost of
drugs relative to being uninsured.
Our hypothesis is that while new products increased both the mean and
variance of expected drug expense in the 1990s, which increased the demand
for drug coverage, at the same time the development of managed drug benefit
programs offered a significantly improved form of drug insurance, with lower
money and time price for beneficiaries. These technology-driven trends are
a major reason why coverage grew so rapidly. Consistent with this, PBMs
(or similar means of in-house managed benefits) are used not only by virtually
all types of managed care plans, but now they are also used by indemnity
plans, which offer managed drug benefits as an addition (carve out) to the
traditional indemnity coverage of physician and hospital services. Similarly,
most proposals for a Medicare drug benefit would use PBMs to administer
the coverage.
V. The Direct Effect of Insurance on Utilization
The dramatic increase in drug insurance coverage over this period—much
larger than for other components of medical spending—suggests that the
moral hazard effects of coverage growth may have made a major contribution
to the increase in drug utilization documented above and hence to the growth
in drug spending. Simple moral hazard theory implies that, given an estimate
of the reduction in out-of-pocket price (dP) and the demand elasticity (E),
we can estimate the predicted increase in volume dQ, other things being
equal: . The average out-of-pocket price fell at a rate of 20–60dQp E# dP
percent per decade from 1970 to the present, with the most rapid decline in
the 1990s. Empirical price elasticities for Rx drugs from cross-section data
are roughly .3.14 These estimates imply that the increase in drug insurance
can account for an increase in utilization and hence in spending of 1.0–2.5
percent per year, assuming no effect on manufacturer prices nor on type of
drugs used. With 1.75 percent as an estimate of annual growth due to coverage
and 8 percent as an estimate of the real (consumer price index (CPI) adjusted)
growth in drug spending per capita since the mid-1980s, this would imply
that about one-fourth to one-fifth of this drug-spending growth was due to
the volume effects of increased insurance coverage.
14 A. Hillman et al., Financial Incentives and Drug Spending in Managed Care, 18 Health
Aff. 189 (March/April 1999); Congressional Budget Office, Issues in Designing a Prescription
Drug Benefit for Medicare (2002) (http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?indexp3960&
sequencep0&frontp0).
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This estimate, that the insurance-induced reduction in average user price
accounts for one-fourth to one-fifth of the growth in drug spending, implicitly
assumes a benchmark of zero spending growth in the absence of insurance
growth. An alternative benchmark is that drug spending would have grown
at the same 5 percent real rate per capita as did spending on other types of
medical care, which experienced a much smaller increase in coverage but
were subject to influences of income growth, technological change, and the
like. Using this 5 percent benchmark, the 8 percent drug-spending growth
implies 3 percent excess drug spending, over and above the growth attrib-
utable to the general drivers of medical spending. Thus, our estimate of a
1.75 percent annual increase in drug utilization due to increased drug in-
surance “explains” about half of the excess spending growth on outpatient
drugs.
These estimates assume that the growth in insurance coverage simply
reduced the average out-of-pocket price of drugs. In fact, the drug coverage
growth also entailed a shift to managed drug benefits, and managed care
plans replaced indemnity plans for other medical services. These changes in
the structure of insurance coverage probably also contributed in several ways
to the increase in drug spending, which suggests that our simple ceteris
paribus estimates are a lower bound on the full effect of insurance on drug-
spending growth in the 1990s.
First, the full user price of an Rx drug includes not only the out-of-pocket
money price of the drug, which was the basis for the above estimates, but
also the out-of-pocket price of a physician visit (if an extra visit is necessary
to obtain an Rx), plus the patient’s time cost for the physician visit and the
trip to the pharmacy. The 1990s shift from indemnity insurance to managed
care and managed pharmacy benefits reduced these other components of the
full user price for drugs, in addition to cost sharing for the drug. Managed
care plans generally charged lower copayments for physician visits and for
drugs than did indemnity plans in the 1990s. Managed drug benefits also
reduced the patient time cost of getting a reimbursed Rx by the use of
pharmacy cards and mail order, as described earlier.15
Second, these elasticity estimates are based on responses to small changes
in price for those people who already have some coverage. They may not
be appropriate estimates of the effect of going from no coverage to fairly
comprehensive coverage. Third, the structure of most managed drug plans,
at least through the mid-1990s, may have encouraged the “mix upgrade”
toward more expensive drugs, conditional on having an Rx, which is the
second major driver of drug spending. Patient cost sharing under these first-
15 Conditional on the number of filled Rxs, pharmacy cards may increase the percent of
scripts paid by insurance by eliminating the “shoe box” effect that leads patients to hoard
rather than file potentially reimbursable claims under indemnity insurance plans. This is one
reason why drug-spending growth as reported by insurers may exceed total drug-spending
growth as reported in national accounts.
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generation managed drug plans was typically either a fixed copayment per
script or a two-tier structure, say $5 for a generic and $10 for a brand. Since
the copayment was invariant with the price of the brand, the patient faced
no financial penalty for preferring newer, more expensive (and perhaps only
marginally better) products over older, less expensive products, as long as
both were on the formulary.16 For all these reasons, our estimates that drug
insurance growth accounts for one-fourth to one-half of total drug-spending
growth are probably a lower bound on the full impact of the 1990s insurance
changes.
These estimates are lower than might be inferred from the simple cross-
sectional evidence in Table 2, which suggests that drug expense per capita
was roughly three times as high for those with both health and drug insurance
as it was for those with neither health nor drug insurance ($437 vs. $133 in
1997). However, as discussed earlier, the cross-sectional evidence in
Table 2 cannot provide unbiased estimates of the effect of insurance on drug
utilization for a given risk type because of biased selection in insurance
demand. That is, if higher-risk individuals are more likely to buy coverage,
the observed differences in drug spending between those with and without
drug insurance overstate the moral hazard effect of coverage for an individual
of a given risk type.17
Other evidence suggests that people with managed drug benefits have
higher drug use than people with indemnity insurance.18 Several factors may
contribute to this outcome, in addition to the lower patient cost sharing for
both physician visits and drugs and lower patient time and hassle cost with
managed plans, as described above. Managed plans have generally encour-
aged substitution of outpatient services, including drug therapies, for inpatient
care, and physicians in managed care plans may substitute drug therapy for
their own time, in response to managed care’s practice of paying either lower
fees or capitation.19 It has also been suggested that managed care plans have
been quicker to realize that drugs can be cost-effective relative to alternatives:
“The cost-effectiveness of outpatient drug care relative to inpatient hospital
16 Only a minority of managed plans used closed formularies that required patients to pay
in full for off-formulary drugs.
17 A study of drug use by seniors (Department of Health and Human Services, Report to
the President: Prescription Drug Coverage, Spending, Utilization, and Prices (April 2000) (http:
//aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/drugstudy/) suggests that insurance increases use disproportion-
ately for more costly and brand-name drugs and for therapeutic categories with important
innovative products for common diseases (antidepressants, statins, proton pump inhibitors for
ulcers). This suggests that insurance contributes to mix upgrade, hence higher cost per script,
in addition to volume of scripts; however, this cross-sectional evidence may also be biased by
insurance selection effects.
18 Alan Lyles & Francis B. Palumbo, The Effects of Managed Care on Prescription Drug
Costs and Benefits, 15 Pharmacoeconomics 129 (1999).
19 The anecdotal evidence from Germany and Japan, two countries with fee for service and
very short physician visits, is that physicians use Rxs as a way to bring a visit to a close.
This content downloaded from 130.091.116.052 on June 03, 2016 09:42:09 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
health insurance and pharmaceuticals 607
care (when it can be substituted) has been recognized by managed care” and
“managed care organizations encourage the use of Rx drugs by including
them in their benefit design.”20
An alternative hypothesis is that managed care plans experienced econ-
omies of scope in applying managed care techniques and information systems
to drug coverage. The basic selective contracting techniques used by PBMs
and HMOs—demanding discounts on drug prices in return for putting a drug
on the formulary and discounts on dispensing fees in return for admitting a
pharmacy to the preferred pharmacy network—are similar to the selective
contracting used for physician and hospital services. Some variants of drug
formularies are designed to encourage use of low-priced drugs and deter mix
upgrade—in particular, incentives for generic substitution and higher copay-
ments or noncoverage of nonpreferred drugs. Most of these techniques focus
on switching between drugs rather than on reducing total volume. Thus, the
traditional PBM copayment structure was not well designed to deter moral
hazard, at least prior to triple-tier copayments. Similarly, managed care’s
copayment structure for physician visits was generally a low, fixed payment
per visit, which seems less optimal for moral hazard control than the co-
insurance percentage used by traditional indemnity plans. Why managed care
used this apparently inefficient copayment structure for both physician visits
and drugs is beyond the scope of this paper. We simply note that it may have
contributed to both the increase in the number of Rxs and the shift to more
expensive drugs under managed drug benefits.
Thus, we conclude that the direct effect of increased coverage on drug-
spending growth was at least one-fourth to one-half of the total, with the
larger figure being more likely if the reduction in the nondrug price com-
ponent of the full user price (patient time cost, copay on physician visits)
was at least as large as the reduction in cash price of the drugs or if other
characteristics of managed care and the managed drug benefit structure in-
creased the use of outpatient drugs, conditional on user price.
VI. Indirect Effects of Insurance on Drug-Spending Growth
A. Promotion and Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and
Other Drug Promotion
Previous authors21 cite the 1997 relaxation of FDA regulations of DTC
advertising as a major driver of the growth in drug spending in the late 1990s.
These regulatory changes permitted drug manufacturers to mention the name
of the drug and its purpose or indication without having to cite the full list
20 Joshua P. Cohen, PBMs and a Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 55 Food & Drug L.
J. 311 (2000).
21 See note 3 supra.
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of side effects and contraindications listed in the approved label.22 Although
manufacturers are still required to provide “balance” in their listing of risks
and benefits, these changes presumably increased the expected positive im-
pact of DTC advertising on demand, thereby increasing manufacturers’ ex-
pected returns to DTC investments.
We hypothesize that the spread of insurance coverage further increased
manufacturers’ expected returns on drug advertising by making the con-
sumer’s demand for insured drugs more inelastic. This effect is especially
likely if cost sharing is in the form of copayments rather than co-insurance.
The Dorfman-Steiner condition for optimal investment in advertising implies
that the optimal advertising budget relative to sales (A/PQ) is inversely related
to the demand elasticity with respect to price and positively related toEq,p
the demand elasticity with respect to advertising : .E A/PQp E /Eq,a q,a q,p
In the simple case of insurance with a 50 percent copayment, the elasticity
of an insured linear demand curve would be 50 percent lower at any gross
price than the uninsured demand curve. Other things equal, such lower elas-
ticity could imply a doubling of the optimal advertising-to-sales ratio. In
reality, since most of the growth of coverage was in managed benefits, which
typically used a $5 or $10 copayment per script, the implied reduction in
demand elasticity is even greater than in the example here. Moreover, if
managed drug coverage reduced the patient’s time price and/or other com-
ponents of the full user price, this would shift the own demand curve and
thereby further reduce own price elasticity.23
This insurance stimulus to drug promotion applies not only to DTC ad-
vertising but also to other forms of promotion, including the quantitatively
more important detailing of physicians. Physicians are necessary, if not pri-
mary, “customers” for Rx drugs. If physicians act as reasonably good agents
for their patients, then their demand presumably reflects the demand of the
patient, including his or her insurance coverage. Thus, the increase in in-
surance coverage that makes patient demand for drugs more inelastic should
also make the physician’s demand more inelastic, under plausible agency
assumptions. Consistent with this, detailing of drugs to physicians has sig-
nificantly increased in the latter half of the 1990s. Thus, insurance growth
may have stimulated all forms of advertising, not just DTC.
Direct-to-consumer advertising is allegedly also used to counteract man-
aged care’s attempts to control moral hazard through restrictive formularies.
It enables manufacturers to reach consumers directly to inform them about
the drugs that are available to treat specific conditions. By encouraging pa-
22 The full listing of side effects and contraindications must be available through an 800
telephone number or a Web site.
23 Of course, a constant elasticity demand curve has the same elasticity at a user price of
.2P as at P, but the reduction in other components of the full user price would reduce elasticity
even in this case.
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tients to request specific drugs by name, DTC has allegedly limited managed
care’s ability to exclude highly advertised drugs from formularies. This as-
sumes that patient dissatisfaction with the formulary is costly to the HMO,
either because physicians complain that they incur time costs to discuss
possible substitutes for off-formulary drugs or because the HMO’s enrollment
is responsive to patient satisfaction with the formulary. Thus, DTC may be
one reason why managed pharmacy benefits have not been as restrictive as
initially expected. Whether this is good or bad is beyond the scope of this
paper.
Much heat but less light has been shed on whether drug promotion in
general and DTC advertising in particular is excessive. This is a complex
issue. Given the rapid rate of change of drug technologies, including both
new compounds and new formulations and indications for old compounds,
patients and physicians need information as new products become available.
Advertising by drug companies, in all its forms, is the main vehicle for this.
Some informational advertising is clearly potentially beneficial, and some
promotion clearly does expand the total market, while some appears to be
designed to steal share from competitor products. We do not attempt a nor-
mative evaluation of drug promotion here. We simply make the positive
observation that the spread of insurance coverage—especially insurance cov-
erage in managed care form because of the relatively low copayments (for
drugs and for physician visits needed to get a script)—would stimulate the
use of DTC and other forms of promotion to increase consumer and physician
demand for drugs directly, thereby counteracting the constraints that for-
mularies try to impose.
Note that this tendency for insurance to stimulate promotion by making
consumer demand less elastic is not confined to drugs—it applies to all
insured medical services. However, the effect on drugs may be greater be-
cause of other characteristics of drugs. Drugs are used by the average con-
sumer more frequently than hospital visits or even physician visits; drugs
offer a relatively painless form of cure and/or improvement in quality of life
compared with most other medical services; hence the elasticity of consumer
demand in response to advertising may be greater for drugs than for heart
surgery, for example. Further, drugs typically have very low marginal costs
and relatively high price–marginal cost margins (reflecting, in part, the high
fixed costs of R&D, production capacity, and so forth), which makes gen-
erating additional sales through advertising more profitable for drugs than
for lower margin products and services. These characteristics plausibly make
drug advertising more responsive to insurance than advertising of other med-
ical services.
Quantifying this indirect effect of insurance on drug expenditures would
require estimates of the insurance-induced increase in advertising and the
effect of advertising on drug utilization and prices. Neither of these com-
ponents can be estimated from readily available data. Other studies have
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inferred a strong causal effect of advertising on drug spending from the fact
that several of the highest-volume products are among the most heavily
promoted. But the direction of causation in this relationship is unclear at
best. Clearly, the payoff to advertising is greatest in large markets, given the
large fixed costs of advertising.
B. Prices
Insurance may affect both the launch price of new drugs and the postlaunch
rate of price increase. To address the latter first, both theory and evidence
suggest that managed drug benefits may have slowed the rate of postlaunch
price growth. The average rate of excess drug price inflation (that is, drug
price growth in excess of the CPI) has been much less in the 1990s than in
the 1980s. Thus, although the spread of insurance might be expected to make
demand more inelastic, this has not been reflected in higher rates of post-
launch price growth for established products. In the case of managed phar-
macy benefits, the manufacturer’s overall demand is presumably more influ-
enced by the PBM’s demand in negotiating price discounts in return for
formulary status than by the consumer’s demand, which may be price inelastic
because of the fixed copayments. One important function of a PBM is to act
as an intermediary to negotiate drug prices for beneficiaries. The use of
formularies enables PBMs to shift market share toward drugs that offer large
discounts. This use of formularies effectively makes the demand facing the
manufacturer more elastic. The slowing of the rate of drug price increase in
the 1990s compared with the 1980s is consistent with this hypothesis that
PBMs made demand more elastic. Further evidence confirming that PBM
demand is more price elastic is the prevalence of discounts that PBMs receive
relative to cash-paying or indemnity-insured consumers.
Estimating the effect of insurance coverage on launch prices of new drugs
is empirically more problematic. The empirical decomposition of drug-
spending growth in Figure 1 only identifies postlaunch price inflation. Any
tendency for new drugs to be launched at higher prices than new drugs in
prior years is subsumed in the residual that includes increased volume and
shift to more expensive drugs. Conceptually, a valid comparison of the launch
prices of new drugs launched in the 1990s with the prices of new drugs
launched in the 1980s would require hedonic adjustments that would almost
certainly be imperfect because the types of drugs were different. This would
remain an “apples to oranges” comparison.
Although we have no empirical basis for estimating the effect of insurance
coverage on prices for new drugs, controlling for their intrinsic but unmea-
sured value, conceptually it seems reasonable to assume that the price elas-
ticity effects discussed above in relation to postlaunch price growth would
apply equally to launch price levels for new drugs. If so, to the extent that
PBMs have more elastic demand than cash-paying individuals or indemnity-
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insured individuals, the growth of PBM coverage should have moderated
launch prices for new products as it moderated the rate of growth of prices
for established products. In conclusion, since the growth in insurance cov-
erage was associated with a change in its form, from unmanaged indemnity
to managed benefits with formularies, there is no strong theoretical basis for
concluding that the growth in insurance contributed to higher prices; in fact,
the contrary is more likely.
VII. Conclusions
The unprecedented spread of insurance coverage for outpatient drugs in
the 1990s was almost exclusively in the form of managed drug benefits and
coincided with the shift to managed care for other forms of health insurance.
This evolution of managed pharmacy benefits was made possible by devel-
opments in information technologies, which enabled formularies, smart cards,
point-of-service DUR, and verification of coverage to be conducted, in ad-
dition to mail order. These innovations in insurance design significantly re-
duced the true cost of drug coverage (measured as the net loading relative
to no insurance) and reduced both the time price to patients and the real cost
of drugs through negotiated discounts on drugs and on pharmacy dispensing
fees. This downward shift in the supply price of drug insurance coincided
with an increase in the demand for drug coverage due to the flow of major
new products, including drugs for several widespread chronic conditions. The
net effect was that most people under 65 with health coverage added drug
coverage to their insurance policies, while coverage also increased for seniors
through a variety of public and private plans. We estimate that for both the
under-65 population and seniors, the percent with drug insurance increased
63–66 percent between 1987 and 1996. The reduction in consumers’ out-of-
pocket price and time price of obtaining drugs in turn led to more scripts
and higher expense per script as people shifted from older drugs to newer,
more expensive medicines. We estimate that the direct (moral hazard) effect
of this growth in insurance coverage accounts for between one-fourth and
one-half of the total growth in drug spending over this period. By making
consumer demand less price elastic, insurance also probably stimulated man-
ufacturer investments in DTC and other forms of promotion, adding a fur-
ther indirect effect of insurance on demand (assuming such investments are
rational).
A full normative evaluation of these trends is beyond the scope of this
paper, but some simple observations are possible. Growth in coverage due
to technological changes in insurance administration and new medical prod-
ucts may well be welfare increasing. One obvious distortion is the tax subsidy
to health insurance, which presumably stimulates some inefficient coverage
for drugs, as it does for other forms of health care. Since this subsidy applies
equally to all medical services but there was no increase in the aggregate
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rate of insurance coverage for medical services other than drugs, it seems
unlikely that increases in marginal tax rates contributed to the growth in drug
coverage. However, the tax subsidy does make it worthwhile to buy coverage
for routine and chronic medications that are a predictable expense if the rate
of subsidy more than offsets the insurance loading, which is likely for most
middle-class taxpayers. Increases in coverage due to the large and growing
tax subsidy to the middle class do not appear to reflect an efficient use of
resources. However, since we tolerate this for other medical services, there
may be no reason to single out drugs for black marks.
The fact that insurers have been surprised by the rapid growth in drug
expenditures suggests that they misestimated the effects of different benefit
designs. In that case, our interpretation of the 1990s experience, as an equi-
librium growth path for insurance design and associated spending, may be
overly optimistic. The post-1997 growth of triple-tier copayment structures,
which raise copayments for preferred-brand drugs and add an even higher
third-tier copayment for nonpreferred brands, does suggest that PBMs have
learned from experience that more sensitive copayment structures are needed
to control moral hazard. But this cannot all be blamed on imperfect foresight.
Managed care plans are shifting from supply-side controls to more
copayment/demand-side controls for other services, not just drugs, partly in
response to the managed care backlash, which may make supply-side controls
politically ineffective, even if economically viable. Thus, although the in-
creased moral hazard from more insurance coverage accounted for a sizeable
proportion of drug-spending growth, other than the tax subsidy, which applies
to all forms of medical care, there is no obvious basis for labeling the
insurance-induced rise in drug expenditures as inefficient relative to other
health care spending.
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